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Abstract 
This paper proposes a watermarking method to embed 
watermark data into fingerprint images, without corrupting 
their features. The method does not require original 
fingerprint image to be able to detect tamper and thus 
authenticate the image. We used 256 x 256 grayscale 
fingerprint images in our experiment. The experimental 
results demonstrate that the precision of tamper detection 
and localization is close to 100% after level-2 detection. 
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Introduction 
Biometrics technology is essential for today’s personal 
identification or verification systems. The security 
requirements of present electronic transactions necessitate 
utilization of reliable factors such as fingerprint features. 
Watermarking of fingerprint images can be used in 
applications like: 1) protecting the originality of fingerprint 
images stored in databases against intentional and 
unintentional attacks, 2) fraud detection in fingerprint 
images by means of fragile watermarking 3) Guaranteeing 
secure transmission of acquired fingerprint images from 
intelligence agencies to a central image database, by 
watermarking data prior to transmission and checking the 
watermark at the receiver site. 
 
There are a few published works for fingerprint image 
watermarking. Ratha et al [1] introduced a data hiding 
algorithm for wavelet compressed fingerprint images. 
Uludag et al [2] introduced two fingerprint watermarking 
techniques in which gradient directions of the feature pixels 
or feature regions do not change with watermarking. The 
watermark decoding does not need the original image. 
 
P. Wong describes a fragile marking technique in [3], which 
obtains a digest using a hash function. The image, image 
dimensions, and marking key are hashed during embedding 
and used to modify the least-significant bit plane of the 
original image. This is done in such a way that when the 
correct detection side information and unaltered marked 
image are provided to the detector, a bi-level image chosen 
by the owner (such as a company logo or insignia), is 
observed. This technique has localization properties and can 
identify regions of modified pixels within a marked image. 
However, Holliman and Memon [5] soon presented a vector 
quantization (VQ) counterfeiting attack that can construct a 
counterfeit image from a VQ codebook generated from a 
set of watermarked images. To solve the problem of VQ 
counterfeiting attack, several enhanced algorithms were 
proposed [6][7]. Nonetheless, they either fails to effectively 
address the problem or sacrifice tamper localization 
accuracy of the original methods [8]. Celik et al.[8] then 
presented an algorithm based on Wong’s scheme and 
demonstrated that their algorithm can thwart the VQ 
codebook attack while sustaining the localization property. 
 
In this paper, we propose a watermarking method for image 
tamper detection. We are interested in local manipulation 
such as additional or removal of part of an image. Our 
method is efficient as it only uses simple operations such as 
parity checks and comparison between average intensities 
as compared to method proposed by Celik et. al. [8]. 
Approach and Methods 
 Watermark Embedding 
The watermarking embedding procedure is described in this 
section. Each image is of size M x N pixels where M and N 
are assumed to be a multiple of six and the number of grey 
levels is 256. 
 
• Preparation 
 
We need to prepare a one to one block mapping sequence A 
→ B→ C→ D → … → A for watermarking embedding, 
where each symbol denotes an individual block. The 
intensity feature of block A will be embedded in block B, 
and the intensity feature of block B will be embedded in 
block C, etc. We use a 1D transformation to obtain a one to 
one mapping among the blocks: 
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where ],1[,, bNkBB ∈
v
 , k is a secret key ( prime 
number), and Nb is the total number of blocks in the image. 
 
The generation algorithm of the block-mapping sequence is 
as follows: 
 
1. Divide the image into non-overlapping blocks of 
6x6 pixels 
2. Assign a unique and consecutive integer 
},...,3,2,1{ bNB ∈ to each block from left to 
right and top to bottom, where Nb= (M/6) x (N/6) 
3. Randomly pick a prime number ],1[ bNk ∈  
4. For each block number B, apply equation (1) to 
obtain B
r
, the number of its mapping block 
5. Record all pairs of B and B
r
 to form the block 
mapping sequence 
 
 
Table 1 -  Mapping of Blocks with k=23,26 and Nb=40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that the secret key, k, must be a prime in order to 
obtain a one to one mapping; otherwise, the period is less 
than Nb and a one to many mapping may occur. Table 5.1 
lists some parts of the mapping sequence generated with 
Nb=40, k=23 and 26 respectively. In this table, B
r
starts to 
repeat at B=21 when k=26, which is not a prime. 
 
• Authentication watermark and recovery watermark 
generation 
 
In the schemes proposed by Wong [4] and Celik et al [8] a 
signature was generated for each block in order to localise 
tamper. Signature generation is computationally expensive 
and requires more bits for embedding, thus it will have an 
effect on the quality of the watermarked image. 
 
In this section a case of using intensity average 
comparisons and parity bits as the authentication watermark 
is presented. To localise tamper in a block, the watermark 
needs to be embedded directly into that block. If a block is 
being tampered locally, the intensities of the pixels 
involved will be changed. This will also change the average 
intensity of the block concerned. To ensure that this is not 
changed, a parity check will be used. However, a parity 
check alone will not guarantee that the block has not been 
changed, because local tampering usually causes burst error 
[5], meaning that if more than one bit has been changed, a 
parity check is no longer useful. Using ECC will help solve 
this issue, but again more watermark bits will be needed. 
To overcome this, the intensity comparison is used as 
another guard if a parity check fails. This feature will also 
be used to break block wise independent. To break block 
wise independent, the intensity of the block is compared to 
the intensity of a larger block. Let B denote the bigger 
block (figure 1) and the smaller or sub block as Bs, then the 
average intensity of B is 
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Figure 1 - A 4x4 Block B 
 
The intensity of each sub block will be used as the recovery 
watermark, and will be embedded in a block mapped by 
equation 1. This is to ensure that if the block is tampered 
with, the recovery bits will be highly likely to be available.  
 
The choice of which signature image to use will depend on: 
 
1. How many LSBs will be used, which is the answer 
to how much degradation is allowed for the 
watermark. 
2. How will the recovered image be used? Will it be 
considered as authentic? If it is not, will it be used 
as an indication of the location and the nature of 
the tampering? 
 
LSB is suggested, to minimise the degradation as medical 
images are very strict with the quality. The recovered 
image, however, will not be considered authentic and will 
not be used for any clinical purposes. One possibility for 
the purpose of recovery is to help in the investigation to 
find the motive and the person responsible for the 
tampering. A 3x3 sub block in a 6x6 block is suggested to 
accommodate two authentication bits and seven recovery 
bits to be embedded in the LSB of each pixel. 
 
• Embedding 
 
For each block B of 6x6 pixels, divide it into four sub-
blocks of 3x3 pixels. The watermark in each sub-block is a 
3-tuple (v, p, r), where both v and p are 1-bit authentication 
watermark, and r is a 7-bit recovery watermark for the 
corresponding sub-block within block A mapped to B. The 
k 23 26 
B B
r
 B
r
 
1 24 27 
2 7 13 
3 30 39 
4 13 25 
5 36 11 
6 19 37 
7 2 23 
8 25 9 
21 4 27 
22 27 13 
23 10 39 
24 33 25 
following algorithm describes how the 3-tuple watermark 
of each sub-block is generated and embedded: 
 
1. Set the LSB of each pixel within the block to zero 
and compute the average intensity of the block and 
each of its four sub-blocks, denoted by avg_B and 
avg_Bs, respectively. 
 
2. Generate the authentication watermark, v, of each 
sub-block as: 
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3. Generate the parity check bit, p, of each sub-block 
as : 



=
,0
,1
otherwise
oddisnumif
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where num is the total number of 1s in the seven 
MSBs of avg_Bs. 
 
4. From the mapping sequence generated in the 
preparation step, obtain block A whose recovery 
information will be stored in block B. 
5. Compute the average intensity of each 
corresponding sub-block As within A, and denote 
it avg_As. 
6. Obtain the recovery intensity, r, of As by taking 
the seven MSBs in avg_As. 
7. Embed the 3-tuple watermark (v, p, r), 9 bits in all, 
onto the LSB of of each pixel in Bs. 
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Figure 2 - Watermark Generation and Embedding Location 
Results 
In evaluating the proposed authentication watermarking 
with tamper detection, different manipulations on two 
fingerprint images were tested to obtain the miss detection 
rate for level-1 and level-2 detection. 
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Figure 3 - (a) Original Fingerprint1 (from National 
Institute of Science and Technology [NIST] Science and 
Technical database http://www.nist.gov/srd/nistsd4.htm), 
(b) Watermarked Fingerprint1 PSNR = 54.5262 dB, 
(c) Watermark Embedded in Fingerprint1, 
(d) Tampered Watermarked Fingerprint1, 
(e) Level 1 Detection-Fingerprint1, 
(f)  Level 2 Detection-Fingerprint1 
 
Fingerprint1 was manipulated using healing brush tool and 
cloning tool. The manipulated sizes are ~60 x 50 and ~100 
x 100 pixels. Figure 3(a) is the original Fingerprint1 
followed by the watermarked image of fingerprint1 (3(b)) . 
Level 1 and level 2 detection results are shown in figure 
3(e) and 3(f) respectively. 
 
Fingerprint2 was manipulated using cut and paste and 
cloning tool. This time the manipulation size is smaller 
ranging from ~ 10 x10 to 40 x 100 pixels. Figure 4(a) 
shows the watermarked image of Fingerprint2 followed by 
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v, p of B 
Block B 
the manipulated Fingerprint2 (4(b)), the areas manipulated 
(4(c)) and the tamper detection for level 1 and level 2. 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
 
Tamper detect
 
(c) (d) 
Tamper detect
 
 
(e)  
 
Figure 4. (a) Watermarked Fingerprint2 PSNR = 54.9982 
dB,(b) Tampered Watermarked Fingerprint2, 
(c) Image Difference , (d)  Level 1 Detection– Fingerprint2, 
(e) Level 2 Detection 
 
Table 2 shows the missing detection rate using level-1 and 
level-2 detection. For level-1 detection, we have a 
maximum of 15% of missing detection rate. We achieved at 
least 99.94% detection rate for level-2 detection. 
 
Table 2 - Miss Detection Rate 
 
 Fingerprint1 
(512x512) 
Fingerprint2 
(512x512) 
Level1 15% 13% 
Level2 0.06% 0.02% 
Conclusion 
We proposed a watermarking scheme that can detect and 
localize tampered images. The purpose is to verify the 
integrity and authenticity of fingerprint images. We 
presented our watermarking procedures that include data 
embedding and tamper detection procedure. The 
experimental results demonstrate that the precision of 
tamper detection and localization is close to 100% after 
level-2 detection. 
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